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The current mix of public and private programs to support workers after they experience disability onset provides benefits
to millions of workers and former workers. Yet, despite the large and growing costs of these programs, the inflation-adjusted
household incomes of workers with disabilities have been falling for more than two decades, both absolutely and, especially,
relative to the incomes of those without disabilities. The aging of the baby boom generation is likely to make matters worse,
and the government’s fiscal circumstance will make it increasingly difficult to sustain existing public programs. Current
public policy initiatives might eventually improve the disability support system, but they are not likely to ward off the
adverse consequences of the pending crisis. Policy changes that leverage existing private sector practices and capabilities
might achieve greater success but have received little attention and are far from proven.
Keywords: insurance; security; Social Security; employment
T
he current patchwork of public and private protec-
tion available to workers who experience the onset
of a long-term disability is both complex and expensive
to administer and is less than fully effective in returning
both those who can work back to work and those who
cannot onto the Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) rolls. Although this mix of public and private
components has served millions of workers well, many
workers fall between the cracks, and many others pre-
maturely move out of the workforce and onto the perma-
nent disability transfer rolls. The household incomes of
working-age people with disabilities are much lower
than those of the rest of the population, and they are
much more likely to live in poverty, despite massive gov-
ernment expenditures to support them. More ominously,
the fissures in this fragmented system appear to be
widening. The incomes of working-age people with dis-
abilities are falling, the prevalence of poverty is rising,
and government expenditures to support them are
increasing at a very rapid rate. People with disabilities
themselves are increasingly frustrated with public pro-
grams that promote dependence and devalue their capa-
bilities. Government, private insurers, and employers
need to better coordinate their efforts to reverse the
declining employment of working-age people with dis-
abilities and delay the movement of workers who expe-
rience the onset of a disability onto the SSDI rolls.
We first present evidence of the rising risks to the
employment and economic well-being of workers and
their families following the onset of a disability. We then
summarize recent disability policy initiatives that have
been proposed to reduce these risks and discuss why they
are not likely to succeed. We conclude with a discussion
Journal of Disability
Policy Studies
Volume XX Number X
Month XXXX  xx-xx
© 2008 Hammill Institute
on Disabilities
10.1177/1044207308314949
http://jdps.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
Authors’ Note: We are grateful for research assistance from Allison
Roche and for feedback from the many individuals we have talked to
about the ideas in this article. Work on the article was supported by a
grant from America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) and by the
Department of Education’s National Institute on Disability and
Rehabilitation Research under its Rehabilitation Research and
Training Center on Employment Policy for Persons with Disabilities
grant to Cornell University. The contents of this article do not neces-
sarily represent the policy of AHIP or the Department of Education,
and readers should not assume endorsement by AHIP or the federal
government (Edgar, 75.620 (b)). The work on this article was
completed while Stapleton, She, and Livermore were employees of
the Cornell University Institute for Policy Research. Address corre-
spondence to David Stapleton, Mathematica Policy Research, 600
Maryland Avenue, SW, Suite 550, Washington, DC 20024; e-mail:
dstapleton@mathematica-mpr.com.
  Journal of Disability Policy Studies OnlineFirst, published on June 20, 2008 as doi:10.1177/1044207308314949
  Copyright 2008 by Hammill Institute on Disabilities.of options for policy changes that would leverage private
sector capabilities. Little attention has been paid to these
options, and they are far from proven. Our limited objec-
tive is to encourage further consideration of these
options and perhaps others that would serve the same
policy objectives.
Stress on the Support System
Workers who experience the onset of a disability are
protected by a public system that is supplemented in a
variety of ways by a private system. The focus of both sys-
tems is replacement of earnings and provision of health
care for those who can no longer work because of a dis-
ability. On the public side, this primarily consists of SSDI,
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicare, and
Medicaid but also includes significant programs that serve
other target populations, such as veterans, low-income
parents, and workers who are unemployed (see Note 1).
On the private side, this includes private disability insur-
ance and workers’ compensation. Much more limited
funding is also available to support return to work, pri-
marily through the federal or state vocational rehabilita-
tion services program, private disability management
services (often in conjunction with private disability insur-
ance), and workers’compensation (see Note 2).
Public sector and private sector expenditures for the
support system are very high. Goodman and Stapleton
(2007) estimate that the federal government spent $226
billion—11.3% of all federal outlays—to support work-
ing-age people with disabilities in 2002, and states spent
an additional $50 billion, primarily for Medicaid. Totals
for private sector expenditures are not readily available.
Private disability and workers’ compensation insurance
premiums paid by employers constitute one component
of private sector costs. In 2004, employers spent approx-
imately $34 billion on workers’compensation premiums
(National Council on Compensation Insurance, 2005). In
2005, employers spent $8.3 billion on long-term disabil-
ity insurance (JHA, 2006, Exhibit B). Employers also
spend an unknown amount for the health care of employ-
ees with disabilities, through their health plans. Paid sick
leave and short-term disability benefits are also an
important part of the support system for people with
long-term disabilities.
Of course, high expenditures for the disability support
system partly reflect the number of working-age people
with disabilities and partly the fact that our society val-
ues the lives and well-being of this population. The evi-
dence presented here, however, demonstrates that the
system is performing poorly. Many would argue that the
system’s inefficiency is also contributing to its high
costs. By far, the largest share of the system’s resources
are devoted to income maintenance and health care, with
a far smaller share devoted to helping people increase
their economic self-sufficiency and well-being through
work (Stapleton, O’Day, Livermore, & Imparato, 2006).
Goodman and Stapleton (2007) estimate that in 2002
only 1.5% of federal expenditures for this population
was allocated to education, training, and employment
support programs. Policies that support and encourage
work might both improve the well-being of this popula-
tion and be less expensive.
In what follows, we present evidence that the risks to
employment and the economic well-being of workers and
their families after disability onset are increasing. Our
intent is to demonstrate that this is a significant and real
phenomenon, not to provide a comprehensive analysis.
The first evidence is that the household incomes of
working-age adults (ages 21 to 64) who say they have
work limitations have been declining for a long time,
both absolutely and, especially, relative to the household
incomes of working-age adults who do not report work
2 Journal of Disability Policy Studies
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Figure 1
Median Household Income for Working-Age
Adults With and Without Work
Limitations, 1981 to 2004
Note: Median household income for men and women ages 21 to 64,
by work limitation status. Inflation adjusted to the value of the dollar
in 2002. Based on the Current Population Survey.
Source: Retrieved October 19, 2006, from www.disabilitystatistics
.org.limitations (see Figure 1 and Note 3). To avoid con-
founding the differential effects of business cycles on
household incomes for these two groups, it is necessary
to consider comparable points in the business cycle. The
most recent data are for 2004, the third year of a recov-
ery, and 1986 and 1995 are roughly comparable. From
1986 to 1995, the median household income of those
without a work limitation increased by 3.1% (after
adjustment for inflation), whereas the median household
income of those with a work limitation declined by
5.8%. From 1995 to 2004, those without a work limita-
tion experienced an additional increase of 7.9%, whereas
those with a work limitation experienced an increase of
only 0.1%. Over the full period, the median income of
those without work limitations increased by 11.3%, ver-
sus a decline of 5.0% for those with work limitations—a
relative decline of 16.3% (see Note 4).
The income evidence suggests that the current disability
system has not maintained the household incomes of people
with disabilities, let alone allowed their incomes to grow on
par with those of other households. Instead, it appears that
those who do not have work limitations are enjoying the
fruits of economic growth, while those who have work lim-
itations are falling further and further behind.
The proximate cause of the divergence between the
household incomes of working-age adults with and with-
out disabilities is the long-term exodus of those with dis-
abilities from the labor force and into public programs,
coupled with the fact that income from all other sources,
including benefits, only partially replaces lost earnings.
The decline in one measure of the employment rate for
those with disabilities is depicted in Figure 2 (see Note
5). The rate for men fell from 40% in 1986 to 28% in
2004. In the same period, the rate for women fell by
much less, from 28% to 26%. These declines need to be
assessed in the context of divergent long-term trends in
the employment rates for men and women without work
limitations—a very gradual decline for men and substan-
tial growth for women. The relative employment rates
for men and women with work limitations (the rate for
those with work limitations relative to the rate for those
without work limitations) controls for these trends. The
declines in the relative rates for men and women with
work limitations are much more similar to one another,
and both are large: from 43% in 1986 to 31% in 2004 for
men, and from 42% to 34% for women (see Note 6).
The causes of these employment rate declines are
not fully understood, and research about the causes is
controversial (Burkhauser & Stapleton, 2004). The tim-
ing of the decline and early research on the topic sug-
gested that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of
1990 had a negative effect on the employment of people
with disabilities because its provisions against employ-
ment discrimination and mandates for reasonable
accommodations created net disincentives to hire and
retain workers with disabilities. More recent research
indicates that the decline started well in advance of the
ADA’s passage (Houtenville & Burkhauser, 2004), and
at most the ADA had a temporary effect just in those
states that did not have laws requiring reasonable accom-
modations prior to the ADA (Jolls & Prescott, 2004). A
substantial body of evidence suggests that changes in
medical eligibility requirements for SSDI have played a
major role, as have unintended increases in the SSDI
earnings replacement rate for workers with low earnings
(Autor & Duggan, 2003, 2006; Goodman & Waidmann,
2003). Others have pointed to the rising costs of health
Stapleton et al. / Income Security for Workers 3
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Figure 2
Employment Rates for Working-Age Adults With
and Without Work Limitations, 1981 to 2004
Note: The employment rate for a group is the percentage of those
ages 21 to 64 who worked at least 52 hours in the previous calendar
year, by sex and work limitation status. The relative employment rate
for each sex is the rate for those with work limitations divided by the
rate for those without work limitations. Based on the Current
Population Survey.
Source: Retrieved February 20, 2006, from www.disabilitystatistics
.org.care (Hill, Livermore, & Houtenville, 2003), increases in
the competitiveness of the labor market (Stapleton,
Goodman, & Houtenville, 2003), tightening of workers’
compensation benefits (Guo & Burton, 2007; McInerney
& Simon, 2007), and the obesity epidemic (Kaye, 2003).
Most important for our purposes is that the exodus of
working-age people with disabilities from employment
has been very large and has been going on for at least
two decades.
The exodus from employment has been accompanied
by a rise in the proportion of the working-age population
that is relying on SSDI for at least part of its income, as
illustrated in Figure 3. Very high rates of SSDI participa-
tion led to substantial tightening of eligibility in the early
1980s. By 2002, however, the participation rates in every
age group were higher than in 1980, with the exception
of the oldest age group. Most of the increases occurred
after 1990. The rise in participation among the younger
age groups is particularly notable. Because few people
exit the SSDI rolls for reasons other than attainment of
the normal retirement age or death, most of these young
beneficiaries will be relying on SSDI for decades. Autor
and Duggan (2006) extensively analyze the reasons for
SSDI program growth and point to the fiscal crisis that is
unfolding for this program.
SSDI and Social Security retirement (SSR) benefits
(for those age 62 or older) partially replace the earnings
of those who qualify, but only partially, and not all work-
ers who experience disability-related earnings losses
qualify for these public benefits. Our own analysis of
married worker respondents in the longitudinal Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) who experienced the onset
of a work limitation lasting at least 2 years after their first
interviews and before age 59 (see Table 1), found that
66% received at least one of these benefits 6 years after
onset, including 25% who received SSDI (see Note 7).
The percentage receiving SSR is high (41%) because
almost all workers in the sample were age 51 or older
when they experienced disability onset (see Note 8). All
the workers in the sample who received SSR 6 years
after onset received early retirement benefits, because
workers who experienced onset at age 59 or older were
excluded from the sample. Hence, they necessarily
received early retirement benefits, which are lower than
they would have received had they waited until age 65 to
claim them. In the single sample, 84% received a Social
Security benefit, including 32% under SSDI and 52%
under SSR (see Table 2).
Mean income from Social Security (including SSDI,
SSR, and SSI supplements for low-income SSDI benefi-
ciaries) replaced only 26% of the mean earnings decline
for the married workers and 34% for the single workers.
These figures are based on the full samples, including
those who did not receive any of these benefits. If we
consider only those who received benefits, however, the
share of earnings replaced is not much different: approx-
imately one third for both married and single workers.
Although mean benefits for those who receive benefits
are necessarily larger than for all workers in the two
groups (i.e., including those with no benefits), mean
earnings declines are also much larger (see Note 9).
Increases in other sources of income, primarily private
pensions (often available at age 59) and disability insur-
ance, fill a substantial share of the gap between the
decline in earnings and the increase in income from
SSDI, SSI, and SSR, but the gap remaining is large. As
of the 6th year after onset, increases in income from all
of the worker’s own sources replaced 55% of the mean
earnings decline for married workers and 57% for single
workers (see Note 10). For the average married worker,
increases in spousal earnings do not help compensate for
the earnings decline; instead, they too decline, by a large
amount—about 45% of the worker’s average earnings
decline. In some instances, onset of disability for one
spouse might cause the decline in earnings of the other
spouse (e.g., if the spouse spends significant time caring
for the worker or must take on many household activities
that were formerly the responsibility of the worker). In
4 Journal of Disability Policy Studies
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Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
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Population, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 2002
Note: Shown is the number of SSDI beneficiaries per 1,000 disability-
insured workers (i.e., those who meet the earnings history requirements
for SSDI).
Source: Social Security Advisory Board (2003).other instances, the decline might be due to unrelated
factors (see Note 11). For married workers, an estimated
56% of the decline in all household earnings is replaced
by increased income from all other sources.
The net result of these income changes for married
workers is that their mean household incomes decline by
23% from 2 years before disability onset to 6 years after.
The decline in median household income is much larger,
35%. The difference between the reduction in the mean
and the reduction in the median reflects the fact that
income changes after onset vary substantially across
households; the means reflect the incomes of the rela-
tively small number of workers who are fortunate
enough to continue to work after onset or who receive
very high increases in other income sources, whereas the
medians do not. Mean household income for single
workers declines by 27%, and the median declines by
45%. Relative declines in after-tax household income
would be lower, because earnings are taxed at a higher
rate than other forms of income (see Note 12).
The HRS findings reported above apply to older
workers only, but it seems likely that younger workers
would, on average, experience comparable or larger rel-
ative income declines after disability onset. SSDI and
SSI medical eligibility criteria make it more difficult for
younger workers than older workers to qualify, and
younger workers would not be eligible for SSR or private
pension benefits for many years. There are offsetting fac-
tors, however. Compared to older workers, younger
workers who enter SSDI might, on average, have a larger
share of their earnings losses replaced because of lower
pre-SSDI earnings, the progressive nature of SSDI bene-
fits, and the availability of dependent benefits for their
children. In addition, younger, low-income workers with
children are likely to be eligible for Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families, assuming they do not
Stapleton et al. / Income Security for Workers 5
Table 1
Mean Household Income by Source, Before, During, and After First Work
Limitation Report, Married Workers
Change in Mean From 2 Years Before Disability Onset to
Mean 2 Years  Onset  2 Years  4 Years  6 Years  Mean 6 Years 
Income Source Before Onset Year After After After After Onset
Own earnings 30,711 –9,542*** –19,709*** –22,726*** –23,468*** 7,242
Percentage with earnings 100 –26*** –58*** –68*** –75*** 25
Spouse’s earnings 21,786 –2,580** –3,735** –7,147*** –10,482*** 11,304
Household capital income 6,347 3,511** 3,406*** 3,658*** 4,367** 10,715
Own workers’ compensation or  234 684*** 591*** 190 –69 165
unemployment insurance
Own pension or annuities 446 836*** 2,112*** 3,028*** 3,615*** 4,061
Own other private income 1,871 566 1,189 408 585 2,456
Spouse’s other private income 1,701 553* 960** 1,366*** 1,159** 2,859
Own Social Security Disability  0 227*** 1,761*** 2,267*** 2,274*** 2,274
Insurance (SSDI)
Percentage with SSDI 0 3*** 20*** 24*** 25*** 25
Own Social Security retirement (SSR) 29 42 899*** 2,724*** 3,942*** 3,972
Percentage with SSR 0 1** 10*** 28*** 40*** 41
Own other government income 387 –162 230* 328*** 415*** 802
Spouse’s other public income 1,828 297 991*** 2,406*** 2,748*** 4,577
Mean total household income 65,341 –5,567** –11,306*** –13,498*** –14,914*** 50,427
Median total household income 55,791 –7,883*** –15,281*** –18,415*** –19,362*** 36,429
Note: The table shows our own analysis of data from the 1992-2004 Health and Retirement Study. Dollar amounts are shown, except where per-
centages are indicated. Disability onset refers to the interview in which the individual first reported a work limitation. The sample includes only
individuals who worked and reported nonzero earnings 2 years before onset, reported work limitation in both the onset year and 2 years after
onset, and were younger than 59 when they first reported a work limitation. Sample sizes for Years 4 and 6 after onset are smaller due to attrition.
The sample size for married workers is 410, of which only 379 had responses for 4 years after onset and only 267 for 6 years after onset. Estimates
for Years 4 and 6 after onset have been adjusted to reflect sample attrition. Bold typeface highlights sources of income that declined between pre-
and post-onset periods. SSDI income includes Supplemental Security Income for those beneficiaries who receive it. The income means and medi-
ans are inflation adjusted, to 2001 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index. Asterisks indicate value is significantly different from zero.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.qualify for SSI and especially if exempted from the 5-
year time limit because of their disability. Such individ-
uals would also be likely to qualify for Medicaid.
Furthermore, if they have any earnings, they can obtain
the Earned Income Tax Credit for low-income families,
which is much more generous for parents than for non-
parents.
For many workers, and especially younger workers,
the decline in household income after disability onset
likely understates the effect of disability on household
income because in the absence of disability the worker’s
earnings would have grown.
Given the evidence from the HRS, it is not surprising
that the decline in employment and earnings of working-
age people with disabilities has translated into a decline
in household income. Earnings losses are only partially
replaced by all other sources of household income,
including all public and private benefits for which they
might be eligible. It should also be noted that the decline
in living standards might well be greater than the income
decline would imply, because of the direct effects of
disability on household expenses (e.g., for health care,
special equipment, home or vehicle modifications, per-
sonal assistance, and special transportation) and the
extent to which the worker contributes to productive
household activities (see Note 13).
Growth in reliance on both transfer payments and
public funding for health care has also meant high
growth in expenditures for public programs. Federal
expenditures to support working-age people with dis-
abilities increased from 6.1% of federal outlays in 1986
to 11.3% in 2002 (Goodman & Stapleton, 2007). The
2002 figure represents 2.2% of gross domestic product
(GDP), up from 1.4% in 1986.
In summary, the disability support system is clearly
under stress. Fewer and fewer working-age people with
disabilities are relying on their own earnings for support,
more and more are relying on transfer payments, but
growing payments have not been sufficient to make up
for lost wages, and expenditures on at least the public
support programs, which account for a very substantial
share of all federal expenditures, are rising at a rate that
is much faster than the growth of all federal outlays and
the growth of GDP.
6 Journal of Disability Policy Studies
Table 2
Mean Household Income by Source, Before, During, and After First Work
Limitation Report, Single Workers
Change in Mean From 2 Years Before Disability Onset to
Mean 2 Years  Onset  2 Years  4 Years  6 Years  Mean 6 Years 
Income Source Before Onset Year After After After After Onset
Earnings 28,861 –9,693*** –19,486*** –20,664*** –20,812*** 8,049
Percentage with earnings 100 –18*** –57*** –66*** –70*** 30
Capital 2,164 365 225 514 1,684 3,849
Workers’ compensation or unemployment  413 641* 710* 108 –216 197
insurance
Pension or annuities 371 820 2,006*** 2,524*** 1,785* 2,156
Other private income 810 1,132 382 –447 915 1,725
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 0 217*** 2,144*** 2,491*** 2,628*** 2,628
Percentage with SSDI 0 7*** 26*** 33*** 32*** 32
Social Security retirement (SSR) 153 202 1,204*** 2,536*** 4,504*** 4,657
Percentage with SSR 2 2* 16*** 30*** 51*** 52
Other government income 486 504 795** 505 660 1,147
Mean income 33,259 –5,812*** –12,021*** –12,433*** –8,850*** 24,409
Median income 27,255 –4,948* –15,063*** –15,484*** –12,383*** 14,872
Note: The table shows our own analysis of data from the 1992-2004 Health and Retirement Study. Dollar amounts are shown, except where per-
centages are indicated. Disability onset refers to the interview in which the individual first reported a work limitation. The sample includes only
individuals who worked and reported nonzero earnings 2 years before onset, reported work limitation in both the onset year and 2 years after
onset, and were younger than 59 when they first reported a work limitation. Sample sizes for Years 4 and 6 after onset are smaller due to attrition.
The sample size for single workers is 123, of which only 107 have responses for 4 years after onset and only 73 for 6 years after onset. Estimates
for Years 4 and 6 after onset have been adjusted to reflect sample attrition. Bold typeface highlights sources of income that declined between pre-
and post-onset periods. SSDI income includes Supplemental Security Income for those beneficiaries that receive it. The income means and medi-
ans are inflation adjusted, to 2001 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index. Asterisks indicate value is significantly different from zero.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.Predicted Increases in Stress on the
Support System
Three factors will almost certainly put additional stress
on the current system over the next 20 years, and beyond.
The first is the aging of the baby boom generation. As evi-
denced in Figure 4, this large birth cohort, born between
1946 and 1964, is now entering the working-age group in
which the incidence of disability onset is highest, ages 50
to 64. In 1990, the oldest were age 44. By 2000, the old-
est were age 54. By 2010, the oldest will reach age 64,
and even the youngest will be age 46. By 2020, all will be
age 56 or older. As is apparent from the figure, the popu-
lation in this age group will not decline by much after the
last of the baby boom cohort reaches age 65. Even though
domestic fertility rates declined starting in the 1960s,
immigration and declines in mortality mean that subse-
quent worker cohorts will be nearly as large as the baby
boom cohort when they reach age 50.
The second factor is the growing cost of health care.
Some of this growth can be attributed to the aging of the
baby boom generation, but the more powerful forces
behind this growth appear to be advances in health care
combined with a health care financing system that
encourages inefficient use of health care resources and
fails to control growth in their use. Health care costs have
risen steadily as a share of GDP with almost no interrup-
tion for 40 years, from just 6% in 1965 to 17% in 2004.
The latest official projection is that they will reach 20%
of GDP in about 10 years (see Note 14).
Growth in health care expenditures puts pressure on
the system in two ways. First, tightening of employer
coverage in response to higher health care costs and
growing out-of-pocket expenditures for workers
increases the incentive for workers with disabilities, who
are relatively high users of health care, to exit employ-
ment and enter public programs, including Medicare and
Medicaid—especially if they have inadequate private
coverage or none at all. Second, the growing cost of gov-
ernment health care programs makes it more likely that
program eligibility and coverage will be tightened as a
way to contain costs.
Projections of rapid growth in federal outlays relative
to federal revenues threaten taxpayer support for the
public programs. The aging of the baby boom genera-
tion and rapid growth in health care are the two most
Stapleton et al. / Income Security for Workers 7
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Figure 4
The Age Distribution of the Population, 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2020
Source: Retrieved October 1, 2006, from the Bureau of the Census, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbpyr.html.important factors driving growth in federal outlays
(including outlays for the entitlement programs) as a
share of GDP. Once the leading edge of the baby boom
generation reaches the full retirement age, in about
2010, growth in federal expenditures for Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid will accelerate. The most recent
long-range projections from the Congressional Budget
Office, based on current law, appear in Figure 5.
Expenditures for these three programs are projected to
rise from 8.5% of GDP in 2010 (the first year of the pro-
jections) to about 11.3% in 2020 and 14.8% in 2030—a
75% increase in just 20 years.
Under current law, federal revenue (including payroll
tax contributions to the Social Security and Medicare
trust funds) is projected to remain stable at about 20% of
GDP. The projections indicate that, in the absence of
large reductions in the growth of outlays or large
increases in taxes, the federal government will need to
increase its borrowing substantially from 2025 forward.
By 2050, the projections for Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid total 93% of projected revenue. Although
long-term projections like these are bound to be inaccu-
rate, even if current law does not change, it is clear that
for the next few decades there will be enormous fiscal
pressure on lawmakers to reduce the growth rate in fed-
eral expenditures. As that growth is driven by the growth
rate in expenditures for the entitlement programs, includ-
ing the programs that are the most important components
of the public support system for workers who experience
disability onset, it seems very likely that those programs
will be scaled back in some significant way.
Efforts to Improve the Public 
Support System
Policy makers, program administrators, and advocates
have long recognized the weaknesses of the public sup-
port system for workers with disabilities, and significant
efforts have been undertaken to strengthen it. Two char-
acteristics of the public programs are the focus of many
of the reform efforts. First, they discourage workers with
disabilities from achievement of greater self-sufficiency
through work, because the major programs provide
support only if the worker’s earnings are very low (see
Note 15). Most notably, in 2007, eligibility for SSDI and,
eventually, Medicare, required that the individual be
capable of earning no more than $900 per month—an
amount that is just over the federal poverty threshold for
a family of one, and somewhat less than can be earned
working 40 hours per week at the federal minimum wage
(see Note 16). Beneficiaries can earn up to that amount
without jeopardizing their benefits, but if they earn $1
over for a sufficient period (normally 12 months or less),
they lose their benefits entirely. More generally, eligibility
for most disability programs is explicitly tied to inability
to work rather than to the impairments and chronic con-
ditions that put people at risk for return to work. Instead of
providing incentives and supports for those with impair-
ments and chronic conditions to maintain their economic
independence, they do the opposite (see Note 17).
The second characteristic targeted for reforms is that
the support system is highly fragmented and poorly coor-
dinated. This is especially problematic for low-income
people with disabilities who might need to rely on public
support for personal assistance services, housing, trans-
portation, food, and so on. Obtaining and managing ser-
vices can be a significant drain on the individual’s time
and on financial, cognitive, and emotional resources—
resources that might otherwise be devoted to self-suffi-
ciency. Behind the poor integration is highly fragmented
responsibility for financing and service delivery. Multiple
federal agencies have significant responsibilities for spe-
cific support programs, and Congressional responsibility
for agency oversight resides in diverse House and Senate
committees. These fragmented responsibilities are mir-
rored by fragmentation at the state and local levels. In
addition, funding and/or administrative responsibilities
for most programs are shared across multiple levels of
government. As a result, programs are poorly coordinated;
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Figure 5
Total Federal Outlays and Revenues as a Share of
Gross Domestic Product, 1950 to 2075
Source: Historical data for 2005 and earlier are from the Congressional
Budget Office, http://www.cbo.gov/budget/historical.shtm. Projec-
tions from 2010 to 2050 are from the Government Accountability
Office, http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/longterm/data.html (retrieved
September 24, 2007).there are many opportunities for agencies to defer respon-
sibilities to other agencies or levels of government rather
than take responsibility themselves; and many political
and administrative resources are spent on cost-shifting
issues, especially between state and federal governments
(see Note 18).
Opportunities exist to both improve the lives of people
with disabilities and slow the growth in public spending
on their support. Taking advantage of those opportunities
requires reforms that help people with disabilities
become more self-sufficient, by addressing both the dis-
incentive and fragmentation issues. The disability rights
movement has been pushing for such reforms, most
notably through the 1990 ADA and the 1999 Ticket to
Work (TTW) and Work Incentives Improvement Act.
Administrators and lawmakers have shown a growing
interest in such reforms, partly in response to the demands
of advocates and partly because of pressing fiscal con-
cerns (see, e.g., Social Security Advisory Board, 2006).
But unless things change, significant reforms will not
be implemented in time to effectively address the
increasing stress created by the aging of the baby boom
generation. Reform efforts are in their infancy and have
not yet demonstrated significant success. Notably, the
TTW and Medicaid buy-in programs, both intended to
encourage work and reduce dependence on public
income support, have at most very limited success in
achieving those objectives to date (see Goodman &
Livermore, 2004; Liu & Ireys, 2006; Thornton et al.,
2006). The Social Security Administration’s (SSA) con-
siderable efforts to launch a number of demonstrations,
authorized by the 1999 Ticket Act and intended to test
interventions that would increase the self-sufficiency
of income support recipients or potential recipients
(e.g., the $1 for $2 demonstration, the Accelerated Benefits
Demonstration, the Youth Transition Demonstration, and
the Mental Health Treatment Study), are several years
from bearing significant fruit.
In the absence of reforms, fiscal constraints will become
more problematic, and pressure for program administra-
tors and lawmakers to slow the growth of existing pro-
grams via eligibility and benefit cuts will intensify. Such
cuts are politically very unpopular because of the hard-
ships they impose on people with disabilities, but fiscal
pressures are very likely to make such cuts irresistible
(see Note 19).
The Role of the Private Sector
In many ways, the major players in the private sector—
private disability insurers, disability managers, and employ-
ers and employees themselves—are good candidates to
respond to the increasing costs of disability onset. But
how they do so will play a significant role in determining
the consequences of the increased stress on the disability
support system.
In fact, as summarized by Hunt, Habeck, Owens, and
Vandergoot (1996), since the late 1970s there has been an
explosion of employer investment in various activities that
fall under the rubric of disability management. Among
other things, competitive market forces have required dis-
ability insurers to offer plans to employers that help them
reduce their liabilities related to the onset of a disability
for their workers. To do otherwise would mean they are
out of business. Disability insurers hire and train disability
managers who use a variety of different methods to reduce
the liabilities associated with the onset of disability,
including identifying necessary work accommodations,
health care, and return-to-work services and providing
assistance with applications for disability transfer pro-
grams. Hence, they are critical decision makers in the mix
of accommodation, health care, return-to-work training,
and transfers that workers will receive following the onset
of a disability. Considerable evidence indicates that best
practice disability management efforts substantially
improve return-to-work outcomes (Hunt et al., 1996). A
recent survey of major private disability insurers found
that 29% of long-term claimants are successfully returned
to work and that insurers spend an average of $3,200 per
client on return-to-work services (Beal, 2007).
Competitive market forces also require employers to
provide the appropriate mix of wage and nonwage com-
pensation to their workers, including protection against
earnings loss due to a disability. To do otherwise means
that they will not be able to hire and retain their workers.
Because ultimately workers are paying for their own dis-
ability insurance via lower wages, presumably they value
this protection at least as much as the wages they must
forego to receive this protection. Hence, it is in the inter-
est of all parties in the private sector to provide any given
level of protection at the least possible cost.
Private sector entities also have several advantages
relative to public programs with respect to addressing the
developing crisis, including the ability to innovate
quickly in response to changing incentives and techno-
logical developments, the ability to change the work-
place in ways that will reduce or delay the onset of
disability or support return-to-work after disability onset,
and the ability to identify employees in the early stages
of disability onset and work with them before they
become disconnected from their employers.
Only a minority of workers have private disability cov-
erage, however. According to the latest National
Compensation Survey (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006),
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ability coverage in March 2006, and 37% had short-term
coverage. Coverage rates vary substantially by job type.
Long-term coverage rates are relatively high for white-
collar jobs, full-time jobs, and high-wage jobs. They are
relatively low for blue-collar and service sector jobs, part-
time jobs, nonunion jobs, and low-wage jobs. Short-term
coverage rates vary in a similar fashion, except that they
are relatively high for unionized and blue-collar jobs
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006, Table 5).
Our expectation is that the private sector will signifi-
cantly intensify its current efforts to manage the growing
cost of disability as the crisis unfolds. Insurer efforts to
market disability insurance to employers and employees
will be increasingly successful as the latter observe first-
hand the rising incidence and high cost of disability.
Employers who face rising labor costs for workers with
specific skills and, especially, experience will invest
more in disability prevention, accommodations, and ser-
vices that help workers return to work after disability
onset. Incentives for disability management companies
to innovate will increase, and opportunities to take
advantage of new technologies will also increase.
However, private sector efforts to find the least cost
method of achieving a given level of protection against
the onset of a disability can also lead them to shift some
of their costs to others—notably the taxpayer—if the
incentives built into government-provided disability
insurance lead each of the parties to conclude that there
is no direct cost to them of doing so. Hence, expansions
in private disability insurance coverage might have net
positive or negative consequences for public program
expenditures. Private insurers invest in helping a worker
return to work after disability onset to slow down the
worker’s movements into long-term private disability
benefits. The more workers covered by long-term private
disability insurance, the greater the share of workers who
will be given a private evaluation of their return-to-work
potential immediately after the onset of their disability.
Some such workers might have otherwise entered SSDI.
At the same time, however, for those workers who are
judged not to be good risks for such return-to-work
investments, private insurers have strong incentives to
advocate for their movement onto SSDI and, eventually,
Medicare. This is because the typical private insurance
contract promises to replace a fixed percentage of the
lost earnings of successful claimants (e.g., 60%) net of
any SSDI payments. Consequently, when an SSDI award
is made, the private insurer’s payment is reduced, dollar
for dollar. For this reason, the typical contract requires
the successful long-term claimant to apply for SSDI, and
insurers routinely assist the claimant in the SSDI appli-
cation process. So an increase in the number of workers
who are covered by private disability insurance could
increase the number required to apply for SSDI and the
percentage of applicants who have a strong advocate
supporting their applications. Thus, despite the return-to-
work efforts of private insurers, expansion of private
coverage could lead to more rather than fewer workers
moving onto the SSDI rolls.
There is also no guarantee that growth in private sector
pressure to manage the growth in the cost of disability
will improve the lives of workers with disabilities.
Complaints against private disability insurers from
workers with disabilities and their advocates are com-
mon now and perhaps will grow as disability manage-
ment efforts intensify. The gist of these complaints is that
private insurers manage costs in a manner that is detri-
mental to workers themselves, such as pressuring them
to return to work at a lower level of pay rather than pro-
viding training, support, or accommodations that would
help them maintain higher earnings, or rather than pay-
ing long-term benefits.
Policy Innovations to Leverage Private
Sector Capabilities
Changes in public policy could potentially leverage
the private sector’s clear advantages with respect to
delivery of return-to-work services in ways that would
benefit workers, their employers, and taxpayers. Workers
would retain greater self-sufficiency after disability
onset, employers would retain more of their productive
workers, and the flow of workers with disabilities into
public programs would slow down. Such changes might
reverse the long-term decline in the economic fortunes of
people with disabilities. This general approach to policy
reform is not a new idea (see, e.g., Berkowitz, 1987;
Berkowitz & Dean, 1996), but it has received scant atten-
tion in the literature. Interestingly, however, the restruc-
turing of the public programs advocated by the Social
Security Advisory Board (2006) calls for the develop-
ment and use of capabilities that already exist in the pri-
vate sector. Although there is no guarantee, it is possible
that efforts to leverage existing private sector capabilities
could be tested and implemented quickly enough to mit-
igate the impending crisis.
The federal government could potentially harness the
capabilities of the private sector in many different ways.
In what follows, we present three options that merit fur-
ther consideration. Our intent in presenting these options
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are not prepared to recommend any of them, for reasons
we discuss in our closing comments, but we do think
they are all worthy of serious consideration.
Payroll tax incentives and return-to-work subsidies.
One previously identified way to align employer incen-
tives more closely with the social costs and benefits of
disability onset would be to experience rate the employer
component of the payroll tax—an approach that employ-
ers are already familiar with from unemployment insur-
ance, workers’ compensation, and health insurance. As
Berkowitz and Dean (1996) point out, this would
increase the incentive for employers to invest in actions
that reduce or delay disability onset and/or help their
employees continue to work thereafter, because employ-
ers would bear a greater cost of the long-term public ben-
efits paid to workers who did not return to work.
The experience-rating system could be designed to be
revenue neutral if there is no change in the number of
workers entering SSDI relative to the number expected
under the current system. However, firms whose employ-
ees enter SSDI relatively frequently would be penalized
by increases in their payroll taxes, and firms whose
employees enter SSDI relatively infrequently would be
rewarded by reductions in their tax payments (see Note
20). All employers would have a greater incentive to pre-
vent disability onset and retain workers after disability
onset. If the number of workers entering SSDI were to
fall, as expected, payroll tax revenue would decline, but
the system could presumably be designed so that the
drop in revenue would be substantially smaller than the
decline in benefits. Furthermore, increased return to
work would increase federal and state income tax rev-
enues and reduce Medicare expenditures.
The biggest concern about experience rating is that it
would discourage employers from hiring and retaining
workers at relatively high risk for future SSDI eligibility. In
principle, this concern could be countered through a sys-
tem of risk adjustments for workers with certain character-
istics (e.g., older workers and workers with certain chronic
conditions and impairments) and/or through enforcement
of antidiscrimination laws, but the effectiveness and practi-
cality of such countermeasures is not known. This
approach would be most feasible in an economy in which
most workers are attached to a single employer throughout
their careers, but that is not today’s reality.
Another approach is to increase federal subsidies and
tax breaks for employers on accommodations and return-
to-work services, which are currently very limited.
Burkhauser, Butler, and Weathers (2002) and Burkhauser,
Butler, and Gumus (2004) show that employer accom-
modations can significantly delay a worker’s application
for SSDI benefits following the onset of a disability.
Presumably other types of services can as well. Such
subsidies presumably would increase return to work and
reduce the flow of workers into SSDI, but the benefit
reductions might not be sufficient to pay for the subsi-
dies in part because some share of the subsidies would be
a windfall gain to employers; that is, they would help
employers pay for accommodations and services that
they would have purchased in the absence of the subsi-
dies. If such subsidies are attractive, one financing option
would be link their introduction to an introduction in
experience rating for payroll taxes that, combined, would
be revenue neutral if there is no change in the flow of
workers into SSDI.
Both of these approaches are “price” approaches; one
increases the price to the employer of an employee’s exit
for SSDI, and the second reduces the price to the
employer of goods and services needed to support return
to work. One feature of these price changes is that they
do not directly involve private disability insurers or dis-
ability management vendors and could presumably be
applied to employers that do not offer private disability
benefits or engage disability management vendors. They
would, however, increase the demand for return-to-work
services. They would also increase the incentives for
employers—and any private disability insurers or dis-
ability management vendors they might engage—to pre-
vent disability onset, encourage return to work after
onset, and help workers avoid or delay entry into SSDI.
Although experience rating on its own has some well-
known limitations, as discussed above, it might be possi-
ble to counter those limitations via well-structured
subsidies and tax breaks.
Private insurer administration of SSDI. A more direct
way for government to involve private disability insurers
is to pay them to administer SSDI benefits for workers
with private coverage in a manner that integrates the
public and private benefits. The premise is that the inte-
grated administration of benefits, if well designed, would
provide the worker with better employment and financial
options than would be available currently—sufficiently
better to slow the flow of workers into SSDI.
More specifically, SSA would hire private insurers to
administer the current SSDI program rules for workers
who also have the private insurer’s short- or long-term
coverage. For these workers, the insurer would handle all
the eligibility determination, continuing disability review,
earnings verification, and other processes currently
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Disability Determination Services (DDS). The insurer
would also make SSDI benefit payments to the worker;
the worker would receive a single check each month for
the combined public and private benefit.
Success would require a strong performance-based
payment system that aligns the private disability
insurer’s financial interests with public policy objectives.
Private insurers would continue to do what they do now:
work with the claimant and employer to return the
claimant to work if that is feasible and pay long-term
benefits if it is not. The difference is that, under a well-
structured payment system, the private insurer would
have a greater incentive to return the claimant to work
and less incentive to encourage and support entry into
SSDI. That should translate into, among other things,
more return-to-work services; more return-to-work cash
incentives for claimants (i.e., short-term payments and
long-term partial payments); more investment in work-
site accommodations, equipment, and job restructuring;
and reductions in private premiums to reward employers
that successfully cooperate in these efforts. The payment
system could include incentives for the private insurer to
provide return-to-work services that will truly benefit
claimants, not just reduce the cost of disability. A well-
designed system would presumably reduce claimant and
advocate complaints against private insurers.
Because the success of an integrated public-private
benefit would require the private insurer to determine the
claimant’s SSDI eligibility, this idea will generate nega-
tive reactions from two sides that are often in conflict
with each other: those concerned about growth in SSDI
benefit payments and those concerned about protecting
the rights of workers with disabilities. The former will
fear that this approach will “pave the path” onto SSDI for
workers with private coverage. The latter will fear that
private insurer greed will deny workers with disabilities
the benefits to which they are entitled. These well-
founded concerns will have to be addressed. In principle,
though, they could be. A more fully integrated disability
transfer system that provided more accurate signals of
the true social costs of the onset of a disability would
give private insurers much greater incentive to not allow
SSDI benefits for those who are ineligible, would give
greater incentives to workers who experience the onset
of a disability to take advantage of work options pro-
vided by their employers rather than apply for SSDI ben-
efits, and would give employers stronger incentives to
retain those workers. To prevent abuse, SSA would pre-
sumably have to audit the private insurer decisions, and
those denied SSDI benefits would presumably have the
right to appeal to SSA. SSA already has an extensive
audit and appeal systems in place for DDS decisions, in
part to counter incentives that DDSs have to make
allowances (see Note 21) and in part to protect the rights
of claimants (see Note 22). Presumably, these systems
could be adapted to address the same concerns with
respect to decisions made by private insurers.
Furthermore, the payment system itself could include
explicit financial incentives to make accurate decisions.
In a well-designed system, processing times for the
relevant set of cases would likely fall and decisions
might well be more accurate, in part because of compe-
tition and in part because of early interactions between
private insurers and claimants. The initial determination
would be conducted in the context of return-to-work
assessments and rehabilitation efforts. In the many cases
for which eligibility cannot be determined on the basis of
SSA’s Listings of Impairments alone, the private insurer
would likely have better information than SSA about the
claimant’s ability to earn above the substantial gainful
activity (SGA) level.
The private insurer would also administer SSDI bene-
fit payments; those workers who are eligible for pay-
ments would receive a single payment that reflects the
combined benefit amount, and SSA would reimburse the
insurer for the public portion of the benefit. The private
insurer would be responsible for adjusting payments
when the beneficiary’s circumstances change and for
conducting continuing disability reviews.
It needs to be emphasized that workers with private
coverage would maintain their public insurance; that is,
they would not have their SSDI coverage replaced by
fully private coverage. They and their employers would
continue to pay payroll taxes, and those taxes would con-
tinue to accrue to the trust funds and determine the size
of their SSDI benefits if they are determined to be eligi-
ble. If a worker changes jobs or the employer changes or
drops private disability benefits, the public benefit would
remain intact, just as it does now. What is different is the
administration of the initial determination and payment
of benefits, which would now be fully integrated with the
administration of initial determination and payment of
the private insurance benefit. SSA would pay private
insurers, rather than the states, to administer current
SSDI rules, but the rules themselves would not change.
In a well-designed system, payments to private insurers
would at a minimum have to be less than the combined
savings from reduced SSA administrative expenses,
reduced growth in SSDI benefit payments, reduced
Medicare expenditures, increased payroll tax revenues,
and increased federal and state income tax payments.
Potentially, private administration of SSDI could be
expanded to cover all workers, including those with no
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qualified private entities would compete with each other
and SSA to offer SSDI administration services to work-
ers and their employers in a manner that is conceptually
similar to competition between employment networks
and state vocational rehabilitation agencies to provide
employment services to SSDI and SSI disability benefi-
ciaries under TTW. The payment and regulatory features
of such a system would presumably be quite different
than those for TTW. Such a system might gain political
support if it is first demonstrated that private disability
insurers can effectively administer SSDI benefits for
their own claimants.
Private insurers and other qualified entities might also
become the cornerstone of a system in which SSDI is
essentially preserved for those who truly cannot con-
tribute substantially to their own support (possibly without
the problematic SSDI work incentives) and a separate
program designed to provide supports for those who can.
MacDonald and O’Neil (2006) refer to the revamped
SSDI program as “earnings replacement insurance” and
the new program as “employment support insurance.”
Similarly, the Social Security Advisory Board (2006) has
called for a public support system under which workers
with disabilities would be assessed and then directed
toward either SSDI or an alternative program that is
designed to help them return to work.
Such approaches to public system restructuring
require an entity to conduct assessments, help the worker
enter the appropriate program, and continue to adminis-
ter and update the worker’s benefits as the worker’s cir-
cumstances change. That function could potentially be
conducted by qualified private entities operating under a
payment and oversight system that would promote
public policy objectives. These entities would have to
establish links to workers and their employers before dis-
ability onset occurs, similar to those already established
by private disability insurers and disability management
vendors. Such links provide the opportunity to intervene
early, help maintain the connection between the
employer and the worker, and make it feasible to design
and implement tailored work supports that benefit both
the worker and the employer.
A Ticket-to-Stay-at-Work (TSW) program. Under the
final approach we consider, the government would pay
private disability insurers for the results it wants to
achieve for claimants who would qualify for SSDI,
namely, return to work and no entry into SSDI. This
could be accomplished through a conceptually simple
extension of the current TTW program. TTW provides
performance-based vouchers that eligible beneficiaries
can assign to qualified providers, known as employment
networks. SSA pays the employment network on the
basis of earnings achieved, with full payment made only
if the beneficiary earns enough to stay off the rolls for a
full 60 months (see Note 23).
Under a TSW program, the private insurer would
identify short- or long-term claimants who would qualify
for SSDI if their earnings were below SGA. With the
consent of the claimant, the insurer would identify the
claimant to SSA, and SSA would make monthly pay-
ments to the insurer to keep the individual at work. The
insurer could use these funds in a variety of ways,
including, in some instances, passing them directly to the
employer or employee. If the claimant later applied for
SSDI, and SSA became liable for benefits in some of the
months for which it had made payments to the insurer, the
insurer would be required to refund the Ticket payments
for those months. SSA would also need to audit the med-
ical evidence presented by the insurer for a random sam-
ple of cases and reduce payments to the insurer in
proportion to the audited cases with insufficient evidence.
If the private claimant eventually files an SSDI applica-
tion, SSA could base its initial determination on an audit
of the medical evidence provided by the private insurer,
perhaps substantially reducing SSA’s disability determi-
nation costs. Early Ticket payment amounts could also be
tied to performance measures, such as claimant satisfac-
tion and estimated SSDI benefit savings.
TSW seems likely to achieve more immediate success
than TTW because potential participants—in this case, pri-
vate insurance claimants—remain attached to their employ-
ers and are already being identified and served by their
employment networks, in this case, the private disability
insurer in collaboration with the claimant’s employer.
Employers that do not offer private disability insurance
as an employee benefit could nonetheless participate in
TSW through engagement of a private insurer or other
qualified vendor for just this purpose. Private insurers or
disability management vendors could potentially offer a
new product that is built around TSW—just as private dis-
ability insurance is currently built around SSDI.
Conclusion
The three approaches we have outlined for leveraging
private sector capabilities to improve public disability
programs, especially SSDI, have various strengths and
limitations relative to one another. Details need to be dis-
cussed, developed, and analyzed, and any such program
would merit significant testing before it is rolled out. A
poorly designed and implemented system could be very
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than slow, public expenditures for disability benefits.
Although ample evidence suggests that employers and
individuals with disabilities will respond to incentive
changes in a manner that can be predicted by economic
theory, we do not currently have sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that any one of these approaches, when
implemented, would produce results that are socially
desirable.
In comparison to an entirely new public benefit, such
as that to be tested under the Benefit Offset National
Demonstration (see Note 24), it seems that programs
encouraging private sector outcomes that lead to greater
investment in keeping workers employed after disability
onset could be tested relatively quickly. A test that
focuses on workers who have private coverage might be
a logical first step because such a test would primarily
involve a change in the financing of services that are
already provided by private insurers to the target popula-
tion and their employers; changes to the services them-
selves would only be incremental. Early successes in
such a test would build support for expansion to a system
that is available to all workers and employers.
The Pathways to Work pilots currently under way in
the United Kingdom illustrate the type of research that is
needed and also illustrate the potential for interventions
that target individuals at risk for long-term disability
before they exit the labor force and enter the long-term
disability benefit rolls (Adam, Emmerson, Frayne, &
Goodman, 2006). Pathways to Work offers a package of
incentives and services to new claimants for incapacity
benefits. Early findings from the evaluation indicate that
the program increases the proportion of these claimants
who are working by almost 10 percentage points (40% of
the base) after approximately 1 year and reduces the pro-
portion continuing to receive incapacity benefits by
about 8% (14% of the base).
Among the issues that need to be addressed in the
design and testing of any system targeted at individuals
at risk for labor force exit and entry into SSDI are the
following:
• Protection of worker rights—will the system ade-
quately protect worker rights without excessively
costly litigation?
• Impact on government expenditures for disability ben-
efits—will the system reduce growth in expenditures
and sufficiently ensure that those who receive benefits
are those who qualify?
• Complexity—will the system be too complex to under-
stand and administer?
• Breadth of the target population—is it feasible to apply
the approach to all workers or just to certain groups
(e.g., workers with private disability coverage via their
employers, those who can work full-time, workers who
are highly educated or skilled, and younger workers)?
• Worker choice, control, and responsibility—to what
extent will the system provide workers with meaning-
ful options, support their ability to direct their own
lives, and hold them responsible for their actions?
• Burden on employers—does the system impose new
costs on employers that are not justified by benefits
likely to accrue to employers, including the hidden
costs of accommodations such as flexible scheduling,
burdens that might be borne by other employees?
• Health care access and the burden of health care
costs—does the system facilitate or hinder access to
health care for the individual or have consequences for
the extent to which the taxpayers, the employer, or the
individual bear the burden of health care costs?
• Balance between investment in return-to-work and
income support—will the system lead to too large a
swing from a system that emphasizes the latter to one
that emphasizes the former?
• The willingness of employers to hire people with dis-
abilities—is the system likely to discourage or encour-
age such hiring?
• Adverse incentives—does the system create opportuni-
ties for insurers and employers to profit through unde-
sirable behaviors?
• Redistribution of disability costs—does the system
substantially transfer disability costs across industries,
employers, or workers in desirable or undesirable
ways?
• Political acceptability—will the system receive suffi-
cient political support to permit implementation?
• Political stability—over time, is the system likely to be
undermined because of the competing interests of var-
ious stakeholders?
At this point, none of the approaches we have outlined
should be considered viable because these issues have
not been adequately explored. All are worthy of further
consideration, however. Perhaps one or more can be
developed, tested, and implemented in time to mitigate
the impending crisis for working-age people with dis-
abilities and the public programs that serve them. More
fundamentally, pursuit of these approaches might lead to
a quantum leap forward in the transformation of the
public disability support system, from one that discour-
ages work and encourages dependency toward one that
offers better opportunities for people with disabilities to
be self-sufficient and share in the fruits of the economy.
Notes
1. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is the disability com-
ponent of Social Security benefits. Workers with a sufficient earnings
14 Journal of Disability Policy Studieshistory, who are determined unable to earn more than a low monthly
amount because of a physical or mental impairment, are eligible for ben-
efits after a 5-month waiting period. After an additional 24-month wait-
ing period, SSDI beneficiaries are automatically eligible for Medicare,
the same federal health insurance program that is available to those age
65 and older. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is available to those
who meet the SSDI medical eligibility requirements but whose assets
and income (including any SSDI benefit) are very low. Almost all SSI
recipients also qualify for Medicaid, the federal-state health insurance
program for low-income families and other vulnerable groups. For a
fuller discussion of the SSDI program and its policy history, see
Berkowitz and Burkhauser (1996). For a fuller discussion of the SSI
programs and its policy history, see Daly and Burkhauser (2003).
2. See Stapleton, O’Day, Livermore, and Imparato (2006) for fur-
ther description and analysis of the public system.
3. The data summarized here are based on the Current Population
Survey (CPS), the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey that is officially
used to track the employment and income of the noninstitutional pop-
ulation. The disability definition used in the survey, self-reported work
limitations, has been heavily criticized (e.g., Hale, 2001) because of its
subjectivity, its lack of clarity, and its sensitivity to the social environ-
ment. Burkhauser, Daly, Houtenville, and Nargis (2002) and
Burkhauser, Houtenville, and Wittenburg, (2003) have demonstrated,
however, that CPS-based employment trends for people with work lim-
itations parallel those based on disability measures that are less sensi-
tive to the environment, from the National Health Interview Survey and
the Survey of Income and Program Participation, especially after con-
trolling for the business cycle, as we have done here.
4. Further evidence on the relative decline of household incomes
for working-age people with disabilities appears in Burkhauser,
Houtenville, and Rovba (2006, 2007).
5. Stapleton, Houtenville, and Burkhauser (2004) provide a sum-
mary of recent statistics on the decline in the employment of people
with disabilities. For further analysis of the reasons for the decline,
see Houtenville and Burkhauser (2004) and Burkhauser and Stapleton
(2004).
6. Another analysis of employment rate trends has demonstrated
that the decline in employment for those with long-term limitations
(reported in each of two CPS interviews, 12 months apart) started in
the middle 1980s (Houtenville & Burkhauser, 2004).
7. The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a longitudinal sur-
vey of older Americans and their spouses (including those younger
than age 51) conducted by the Survey Research Center at the
University of Michigan on behalf of the National Institute of Aging.
We examined two of the cohorts followed by the study. The original
HRS cohort, consisting of adults born between 1931 and 1941, was
first interviewed in 1992, when they were 51 to 61 years old, and then
reinterviewed biennially from 1992 to 2004. The second cohort, the
“War Babies,” consisting of adults between the ages of 51 and 61 in
1998, were first interviewed in 1998 and reinterviewed in 2000, 2002,
and 2004.
8. Respondents were included if they were working and did not
report a work limitation at their first interviews, but did report a work
limitation in each of two successive biennial interviews, and were
younger than 59 when they first reported a work limitation. Spouses
of the respondents were included in the sample if they met all the
selection criteria, and a few of these were younger than 51 when they
first reported a work limitation.
9. The statistics for those with Social Security benefits are neces-
sarily based on the sample observed through 6 years after onset only.
In each marital status category, for those who obtain benefits the
increase in mean Social Security benefits from 2 years before onset to
6 years after onset is necessarily much larger than the mean for all
workers in the same marital status category, but mean earnings
declines for those who obtain benefits are also much larger than for
those who do not. In the sample, the mean benefit change (retirement
and disability, combined) for the 51 single workers with benefits 6
years after onset was $8,792, compared to a mean earnings decline of
$26,334; the corresponding figures for the 163 married workers with
benefits 6 years after onset are $9,884 and $29,691.
10. In addition to private disability insurance and pension income, we
counted the change in capital income (for married workers, we counted
only half of the increase), the change in income from workers’compen-
sation or unemployment insurance, and other government income.
11. The numerator of the calculation for married workers includes
half of household capital income and workers’ income from unem-
ployment insurance or workers’compensation, pensions or annuities,
other private income, SSDI, and SSR.
12. Tax data are not available for HRS respondents. The effects of
differential taxation can, however, be illustrated for the hypothetical
“average” single and married workers in our sample (i.e., workers
who have the average income that we report in each income category)
based on 2002 tax law and reasonable assumptions about their house-
holds’ circumstances. Whereas the average single (married) worker
experienced a 27% (23%) reduction in pretax household income as of
the 6th post-onset year, we estimate that both experienced only a 15%
reduction in after-tax household income. We assumed that all earn-
ings are subject to the full Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes
for employees (7.65%); all reported Social Security benefits are
subject to the rules that exempt part or all of the benefits from taxa-
tion, depending on the amount of the household’s other income;
reported capital income is taxed at the 15% capital gains rate; all
other income is fully taxable; the single worker had no dependents;
the married worker and spouse had no other dependents and filed fed-
eral taxes jointly; both used the standard deduction for their filing sta-
tus; and that state and local income taxes are equal to 5% of federal
taxable income. Note that workers’ compensation income is not tax-
able, although unemployment insurance income is. Pension and
annuity income is generally taxable unless original contributions to
the plan were taxed.
13. Although nonincome benefits might compensate for the effect
of some of these factors on individual and household well-being, recent
evidence suggests that they only partially do so, at best. She and
Livermore (in press) find that adults with disabilities living in low-
income households are much more likely to experience material hard-
ship (e.g., go hungry) than those without disabilities in households with
comparable income and other characteristics. Extraordinary expendi-
tures might also help account for the substantial reductions in wealth
after work limitation onset found by Johnson, Mermin, and Uccello
(2005) in their own analysis of the HRS data—comparable in magni-
tude to the declines associated with a job layoff and much larger than
those associated with the death of a spouse.
14. Based on health expenditure estimates and projections from
http://wwhw.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/03_National
HealthAccountsProjected.asp and estimates and projections of the
gross domestic product from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables06
.html (retrieved November 5, 2006).
15. See Stapleton et al. (2006) for further discussion of these two
characteristics of current public programs. See Bound and Burkhauser
(1999) for an economic analysis of the public disability programs.
16. This is the Social Security Administration’s substantial gainful
activity earnings level for most beneficiaries in 2007. A larger value,
Stapleton et al. / Income Security for Workers 15$1,500, applies to blind beneficiaries. The poverty guideline for a
family of one is $817 per month. The federal minimum wage in 2006
was $5.15 per hour; at that wage rate, monthly earnings based on a
40-hour work week would be $893. Automatic cost-of-living adjust-
ments apply to each of these amounts except the minimum wage
(Social Security Administration, 2006).
17. See Social Security Advisory Board (2003) for a discussion of
whether the statutory definition of disability should be changed.
18. See Goodman, Stapleton, Livermore, and O’Day (2007) for a
detailed description of fragmentation that people with disabilities
face in the health care system.
19. See Autor and Duggan (2006) for further discussion of the
potential for tightening eligibility and reducing benefits.
20. Experience ratings might be age adjusted so as not to discour-
age employers from hiring older workers. Adjustments for other fac-
tors deemed exogenous to the behavior of workers and employers
might also be warranted.
21. SSDI awards result in transfers of federal payroll tax revenues
to state residents, and state politicians have an interest in pleasing
their applicant constituents. In addition, an SSDI award can reduce
state expenditures if the applicant would otherwise be eligible for
benefits from a state or federal-state program (e.g., Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families and Medicaid). State SSI supplements
and state financial obligations under Medicaid reduce the incentives
to allow benefits for low-income applicants who are not already
receiving cash or health benefits from the state.
22. See Stapleton and Pugh (2001) for a description and review of
these processes and their implications for allowances.
23. See Thornton et al. (2006) for additional details. Most employ-
ment networks are private entities, but all state vocational rehabilita-
tion agencies also participate in the program.
24. This demonstration will test a work-oriented benefit design
that includes replacement of the “cash cliff” (100% reduction in
benefits) when earnings equal substantial gainful activity with
payments that will decline by one dollar for every additional two
dollars earned.
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